Leon’s last minute changes to the initialed agreement in Skhirat upended the political negotiations, made no less difficult by his insistence that Libyan factions may only accept or reject this final version—a stance seemingly contradictory to his own eleventh-hour alterations.
Leon also failed to address questions surrounding the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its General Commander Khalifa Haftar, deferring the matter to the future GNA. Yet Leon’s paradoxical sidestepping of this key issue diminishes hopes for the formation of a unity government at all. Hardline supporters of the LNA and General Haftar have always argued that the dialogue process is only meant to undermine the Army and empower militias, a position reinforced by Leon’s unfortunate endorsement of figures such as Abdulrahman al-Swehli and Fathi Bashagha (both from Misrata) to the key posts of President of the State Council and the Chairman of the National Security and Defense Council, respectively. As a result, hardliners in Tobruk saw the perfect opportunity to mobilize parliamentarians, local municipal councils in eastern Libya, and key tribes against the latest peace proposals.
For any peace proposal to work in Libya it must carefully weigh any potential candidate and his or her impact on the peace process and a future unity government. Endorsing Swehli and Bashagha for such sensitive posts without providing guarantees for the LNA, its leadership, and their supporters was a miscalculation on Leon’s part. Without a military balance between formerly warring factions, a unity government could not succeed. A more delicate course would have included the preservation of the LNA and its leadership for the duration of the peace agreement or securing a key post for Haftar within the GNA (other than the General Commander of the Armed Forces) such as Chairman of the Defense and National Security Council or the Minister of Defense.
Relying on the relative consensus achieved through the yearlong dialogue process to birth a new unity government in Libya has become an increasingly difficult if not an impossible task. Yet the lack of agreement threatens a complete power vacuum in Libya, given the expiration of internationally recognized House of Representatives on October 21.