

1. The Big Picture

LNA declares unilateral truce to consolidate & form transitional gov. in East

Political developments in the east took centre stage this week after Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar abolished the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), or Skhirat Agreement, and effectively took charge as the executive authority in areas under LNA control as of 28 April. Meanwhile, a day later the LNA general command announced a truce during the holy month of Ramadan. WB's analysis in the past report holds true. The truce declaration corroborates the assessment Haftar's forces will now focus on the political battle. However, a resumption of hostilities and escalation remains likely during or after Ramadan.

Turning to this week's combat developments, Government of National Accord (GNA) forces continued to target LNA supply lines south of Bani Walid and placed greater emphasis on Al-Wattiyah airbase. In Tripoli, frontlines remain unchanged, despite temporary GNA gains across Hadba Al-Mashro', Garabolli and the Airport Road engagement axis.

Politically, in the absence of a clear roadmap, Haftar's move to scrap the LPA raised local concerns over the status of the House of Representatives (HoR) and whether the LPA-derived institution will be dissolved. This uncertainty was underlined by the ambivalent position taken by Aguila Saleh, the HoR Speaker who presented a political proposal just hours before Haftar's bid to govern by "popular mandate".

Initially, it was thought Aguila Saleh and Haftar were engaged in a political tussle over influence in the east. In video footage across social media, Saleh discussed the latest political initiative with fellow Obeidat tribesmen, the largest tribe in the East. Saleh purportedly spoke of pressure by Moscow on the LNA to declare a truce due to a weakened posture in Tripoli. The footage was described as the sign of a rift between Haftar and Saleh, though it became apparent the HoR speaker was only answering to frustrated members of his tribe.

Saleh later clarified his position and renewed his support for the LNA's military and political projects. Saleh's statements prompted speculation the HoR speaker was under significant pressure from Haftar. Saleh claimed his eight-point peace proposal complements Haftar's political push. In an interview with local media, Saleh claimed his recent conversation with US Ambassador Richard Norland was misinterpreted as a call to lay down arms.

Regardless, Saleh's position remains shrouded in uncertainty. The main question is not if, but where Saleh and Haftar's proposals do align and where they diverge. Saleh is likely treading carefully to ensure his statements do not contradict the LNA's manoeuvres. Ultimately, developments over the past week have underlined the importance of the tribal element in Libya as the differentiating factor in any political agenda.

For now, it appears the eastern coalition has held together in the aftermath of Haftar's announcement. Regardless, Haftar's camp will continue to be under pressure to inject more funds/liquidity in the East and take control of oil and gas revenues in the medium term.

Creating a transitional government will temporarily help the LNA consolidate its budget and spending, though pressure will remain to provide a long-lasting solution. It remains to be seen how long the transition from a government run by the LNA to a new unity government will last. Haftar and the LNA likely have an interest in delaying any power sharing arrangement that would see Tripoli-based figures assume power, even if the current GNA cabinet is replaced.

Looking ahead, the LNA and its foreign backers have clearly placed their bets on laying the groundwork for a new government. The LNA and its backers are hopeful by the time negotiations resume, the transitional government would have garnered enough support locally to be presented as the only inclusive Libyan-Libyan solution at the negotiating table. Work is reportedly underway to form a Supreme National Council headed by the LNA and a government of experts to lead the transition. The new government will reportedly include tribal representatives and military officers. For this government to be inclusive, the LNA could look to increase its support base in Libya's south.

In all scenarios, the truce is unlikely to hold in the medium term or transform into a permanent ceasefire, despite calls by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) urging parties to the conflict to build on recent international calls for a humanitarian ceasefire and resume the 5 + 5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks on a virtual basis. The GNA officially rejected the truce and stressed it will continue defending the capital, claiming Haftar's forces have repeatedly violated past truce agreements.

Given the LPA and its institutions were a cornerstone of the Berlin Conference, Haftar's latest move bodes ill for the EU-led political initiative. As a result, Moscow could look to take the lead again on the Libyan file. The situation provides Moscow with an opening to intervene as a mediator and help carve an alternative political track. Of note, the Berlin Conference stipulates that the LPA is a "viable framework" for a political solution in Libya, but it does not necessarily view it as the only way forward. Russia, which abstained from voting to pass UN Security Council Resolution 2510, could bring parties to the negotiating table but only after ensuring its interests are met by Haftar's newly-formed transitional government. In the meantime, political manoeuvres will do little to change the military reality on the ground in Tripoli.

KEY POINTS

- Coronavirus cases reach 63; GNA rejects truce
- Aguila Saleh reiterates support for Haftar
- Work underway to form transitional gov. in East



CONTENTS

- 1 THE BIG PICTURE
LNA declares unilateral truce to consolidate & form transitional gov. in East
- 2 NATIONWIDE SECURITY
Events, Analysis and Data
- 3 SECURITY BY NUMBERS
Charts, Statistics and Analysis
- 4 TRIPOLI REPORT
News & Neighborhoods
- 5 BENGHAZI REPORT
News & Neighborhoods
- 6 WHAT'S NEXT
Forward Looking Expert Opinions

2. National Security Map

Uptick in GNA airstrikes near Nasmah; LNA continues to down GNA-operated UAVs


Key

THREAT INDICATORS

- Severe Threat
- High Threat
- Moderate Threat

EVENT INDICATORS

-  IED | VBIED
-  Violent Clash
-  Isolated Gunfire
-  Other



A preliminary agreement has been reportedly reached between Libyan and Tunisian authorities to resume commercial traffic at the Ras Ajdir Libyan-Tunisian border crossing on 03 May. Only Tunisian drivers/vehicles are reportedly allowed to transport goods into Tunisia, and vice versa for Libyan drivers bringing goods into Libya. The exchange of goods will take place at the border crossing point, according to local reports.

LNA air defence systems downed a GNA-operated UAV over Abugrein at approximately 0230hrs on 02 May.

Heavy explosions were reported in Nassma, south of Bani Walid, after a GNA-operated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was downed in the area at approximately 1800hrs on 01 May.

LNA airstrikes targeted GNA positions in Qaddahiyah in the morning on 03 May.

GNA airstrikes targeted the LNA-controlled Al-Wattiyah Airbase in the early hours of 03 May.

The GNA Ministry of Foreign Affairs extended a letter of protest to French authorities following unverified reports of Rafale fighter aircraft flying over Misrata and Abugrein in the afternoon on 29 April.

On 29 April, sources reported Tebu forces were gathering south of Sabha Airport in preparation to attack the Tamahint Airbase.

Unidentified assailant(s) raided the house of a Libyan businessman and stabbed him to death in Sabratah in the evening on 28 April. The motive behind the incident remains unknown.

Pro-GNA accounts reported airstrikes targeted an LNA convoy in the Wadi Marseet area, located between Mizdah and Qaryat villages, in the morning on 29 April. Reports indicate the airstrikes targeted a truck and four pick-up vehicles loaded with ammunition.

A GNA-operated Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) airstrike targeted a truck carrying commercial beekeeping equipment destined for local distributors in Nasmah, killing four civilians and injuring two others in the early hours of 28 April.


On 02 May, the Murzuq Military Council issued a statement supporting the GNA and rejecting Haftar's bid to take charge of the government in areas under LNA control. The statement would follow an attempt, allegedly blocked by the LNA's 166 Battalion, to issue a pro-GNA statement by an unknown group in Sabha.

Reports indicate GNA forces targeted Tarhunah with Grad rockets at night on 27 April. Local reports indicate the rockets landed on the eastern side of the city and were launched from Msallata.

3. Nationwide Security Analysis

Majority of fatalities spread across west; drop in Tripoli mortar attacks


Nationwide fatalities by type of attack (Past week)




Nationwide incidents by type of attack (Past week)



Nationwide fatalities by national district (Past week)



Nationwide incidents by national district (Past week)



Nationwide Fatalities by Type of Attack (Past 27 Weeks)



Data Analysis

WB recorded this week a total of 23 confirmed deaths in Libya, which compares to 69 deaths reported last week and 146 the week before, marking an overall decrease in fatalities in contrast to the previous week. Similar to the patterns witnessed since the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched its offensive on Tripoli in early April 2019, the majority of fatalities remain related to combat operations and are commonly a result of mortar/rocket shelling incidents, airstrikes, violent clashes, and civilians caught in crossfire. Beyond combat, two assassinations and one attack by knife accounted for three fatalities. Of note, the fatality toll would likely stand higher if verified statistics were available, particularly as this week saw a GNA push on the Al-Hadba Al-Mashro-Airport Road axis, with the LNA claiming 9 deaths and 16 injuries as a result of a repelled attack in the area. Meanwhile, skirmishes between Misrata armed factions and Ghneiwa militiamen on Al-Hadba Tool Road resulting in two fatalities, including a civilian who succumbed to his wounds after being hit by a stray bullet during the skirmishes. Meanwhile, the number of violent clashes, airstrikes, mortar/rocket incidents, and subsequent explosions dropped this week, which coincided with a decrease in military activity across Tripoli's frontlines in contrast to the previous week. Several incidents were recorded throughout the country including 57 mortar/rocket incidents and 54 audible explosions as a result, 28 violent clashes, 9 isolated gunfire cases, 8 airstrikes, 7 arrests, 4 robberies, 3 demonstrations, 2 assassinations, 1 attack by knife, 1 IED/VBIED landmine explosion, 1 kidnapping and raid.

In western Libya, WB recorded a total of 172 incidents, including 143 in Tripoli, as the capital city witnessed a slight decrease in military activity across Tripoli's frontlines, including a significant drop in mortar/rocket shelling incidents. In Tripoli, WB recorded 53 mortar/rocket shelling incidents and 51 audible explosions as a result, 27 violent clashes, 5 arrests, 3 isolated gunfire cases, 1 raid, and 1 robbery. Turning to arrests, reports allege LNA forces captured a prominent extremist with ties to the Islamic State (IS) fighting in GNA ranks on the Wadi Al-Rabei frontline on 30 April. The individual, identified as Tarik Al-Baroussi or "Abu Abdallah", is allegedly from Benghazi. The development has not been independently confirmed by WB sources. In a separate development, the GNA Mol arrested a prominent IS media figure. The Mol reported the suspect was among militants commanded by Ahmed Saleh Al-Hammali also known as "Abu Abdallah", who ran an IS cell in Tripoli and was responsible for conducting several terror operations between 2014-25. Al-Hammali was killed by Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous (BAM) forces during the battle of Sirte in which IS were defeated.

In the wider western region, WB recorded a total of seven GNA airstrikes across Al-Murgub and Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi districts, while one LNA airstrike targeted GNA positions on the Abugrein frontline on 26 April. Meanwhile, the LNA downed five GNA-operated Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) across the Misrata, An-Nuqat Al-Khmas and Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi districts. Separately, an exchange of indiscriminate shelling was reported in the Tarhuna and Msallata vicinities. Beyond military activity, a local was stabbed to death inside his house in Sabratah, while a ten-year-old girl was kidnapped in Msallata. Further, the theft of electrical wires was reported in Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi, Al-Jfara, Al-Murgub, and Tripoli districts.


Meanwhile in the central region, military operations remain frequent in areas lying on the Misrata-Sirte border. Reports indicate the LNA downed a GNA-operated Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on the Al-Weshka axis in the early hours of 28 April. No further security incidents were reported across the central district throughout the reporting period.

Turning to the south, the security environment was dominated by the local response to Haftar announcing LNA control over the country. On 02 May, the Murzuq Military Council issued a statement in support of the GNA and in rejection of Haftar's LNA taking over the country. The statement would follow recent reports of a failed attempt to issue a pro-GNA statement by an unverified group in Sabha. The failed attempt was reportedly blocked by the LNA's 166 Battalion. Separately, notables and sheikhs of Taraghin issued a statement voicing their support for Haftar and the LNA assuming power in Libya.

In the eastern region, pro-LNA demonstrations were held across Benghazi in the aftermath of Haftar announcement. Separately, reports indicate three gang members set fire to a 10-year-old boy after they caught him recording them slaughtering a donkey behind a butcher shop in Tobruk on 28 April. Reports indicate the perpetrators tied up the victim and poured benzene on him resulting in his immediate death. In an act of retaliation, the victim's relatives set fire to one of the perpetrator's houses later that night. Unverified reports suggest Tobruk's security forces arrested the criminals.

4. Tripoli Neighborhood Report

GNA forces focus on Hadba-Airport Rd axis after rejecting LNA Ramadan truce



KEY INCIDENTS

1. (03-01 May) GNA advances on area b/w BPMC & Hamza Camp; LNA denies advance
2. (02 May) LNA units down GNA-operated Turkish UAV in Arada after it took off from MJJ
3. (01 May) Indiscriminate shells land on Zanatah killing at least two relatives
4. (30 Apr) Man killed in dispute with criminal gang in Janzour; killer attacked with RPGs
5. (30 Apr) LNA forces allegedly capture IS militant fighting in GNA ranks in Wadi Al-Rabei
6. (29 Apr) Video circulates purportedly showing pro-GNA Syrian mercenaries attacking TIP
7. (29-30 Apr) Clashes concentrated ivo Garaboli; GNA forces reach Al-Hawatern area
8. (28-29 Apr) GNA forces encircle LNA units & advance in area b/w BPMC & Furosiya Camp
9. (28 Apr) Security forces raid LRC & expel employees under previous administration
10. (28 Apr) Valve of gas pipeline feeding khoms power station reopened in Sidi Al-Sayeh
11. (27 Apr) Shell lands on house in Al-Shridat killing mother & son, wounding three others
12. (26 Apr) Skirmishes b/w Misrata forces & Ghneiwa militia on Al-Hadba Tool Road
13. (18 Apr) TPF releases footage of OP to intercept alleged Tripoli pro-LNA sleeper cell

GNA advances on Hadba-Airport Rd axis

WB sources reported clashes were concentrated on the Al-Hadba Al-Mashro'/ Airport Road frontline, specifically near Al-Fahm Roundabout, Hamza Camp and Al-Forousiya Bridge, after which GNA forces gained control over the area between Brega Petroleum Marketing Company (BPMC) and Hamza Camp over the past 72hrs. Meanwhile, the LNA's Military Information Division (MID) denied GNA control over Hamza Camp or in the BMPC vicinity, claiming that LNA forces repelled an attack on the Al-Hadba Al-Mashro' axis and captured two Turkish armoured vehicles. Of note, the GNA officially stressed its firm position to continue defending the capital from LNA forces on 01 April. In a statement, the GNA based its refusal of the humanitarian truce on past LNA violations, claiming Haftar's forces have continued to ignore calls for a political resolution.

LNA units down Turkish UAV in Arada

LNA units downed a GNA-operated Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Souq Al Jum'aa's Arada area after it took off from Mitiga International Airport (MJJ) at approximately 1300hrs on 02 May. Pro-GNA accounts claimed the UAV crashed due to technical malfunction.

GNA Mol arrest prominent IS media figure

On 28 April, the GNA's Ministry of Interior (Mol) reported the arrest of a Sudanese Islamic State (IS) media official, Saeed Abdul Karim, also known as "Abu Rami Kimo", who worked in the group's local media during the group's control of Sirte. The Ministry reported the arrest was carried out by the Counter-Terrorism (CT) Force in an unidentified location following a security operation that lasted for weeks. The militant confessed he worked for Ansar Al-Sharia from 2012-14, but later pledged allegiance

to IS, working for the group's Al-Bayan Radio Station in Sirte. The militant was referred to Public Prosecution and reportedly found in possession of intelligence on IS operations during the group's control of Sirte between 2015-16. The operation is part of efforts by the Mol to enact security sector reforms and project law enforcement capabilities.

Local dispute fuels retaliation attack

Local tensions were reported in Tripoli's Janzour area after a man was killed due to a dispute with a criminal gang on 30 April. The death of the male victim prompted locals to attack the killer and fire rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds.

Skirmishes between Ghneiwa & Misrata forces


WB sources reported skirmishes between Misrata and Ghneiwa armed factions, killing a civilian after a stray bullet hit his house on Al-Hadba Tool Road at approximately 0100hrs on 26 April. Reports indicate a Ghneiwa-affiliated military vehicle opened fire on a Misrata-affiliated vehicle at the Salah Eddien Traffic Lights, after which the Misrata forces chased Ghneiwa's forces on Al-Hadba Tool Road. Meanwhile, pro-LNA accounts reported a Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) member fighting in GNA ranks was killed in the skirmishes.

TPF-Nawasi arrest pro-LNA sleeper cell

The Tripoli Protection Force (TPF) militia coalition released edited video footage of a purported operation to intercept a pro-LNA sleeper cell. The operation was carried out by Nawasi militia members under the Libyan Intelligence Services (LIS) banner and supported by the TPF on 18 April. The TPF claims the pro-LNA sleeper cell was well-equipped and planning to carry out attacks across Tripoli's Hai Al-Andalus. The TPF first intercepted and interrogated two alleged pro-LNA cell members before raiding an ops room where arms and equipment were discovered.

5. Benghazi Neighborhood Report

Pro-LNA demonstrations after Haftar accepts “popular mandate”



KEY INCIDENTS

1. (28 Apr) Pro-LNA demonstrations after Haftar announces LNA takeover
2. (27 Apr) Large quantity of narcotics seized in police raid
3. (26 Apr) Prominent alcohol trader arrested in police ambush

Pro-LNA demonstrations

Local reports indicate Benghazi witnessed pro-LNA demonstrations after Haftar announced the LNA would assume power in Libya due to popular mandate and subsequently abolished the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) on 28 April. Reports indicate pro-LNA demonstrations were held across Al-Kish Square, Dubai Street and Istiklal Street, where locals chanted pro-LNA slogans and denounced the GNA. The demonstrations came in violation of orders by health authorities to avoid large gatherings in line with preventive measures against the spread of the coronavirus pandemic in Libya.

Police raid drug hideout

Benghazi's Rescue Police Station seized a large quantity of cannabis resin (hash) after raiding a drug trafficking hideout in the Buhdima area on 27 April. Police members reported a gunfire exchange during the raid with at least one suspect managing to escape. The suspect was identified, and a police search is underway. Of note, drug-related crime remains common in Benghazi's Buhdima area.

Prominent alcohol dealer arrested

Benghazi Security Directorate reported the arrest of the most prominent illicit alcohol dealer, locally known as the son of "Al-Hool", following a police ambush in Benghazi's Al-Majouri area on 26 April. The Directorate reported that police forces were subject to violence resistance during the ambush. The suspect confessed to the charges and referred to Public Prosecution.

6. What's next

EU Op. Irini to enforce arms embargo; GNA attacks Al-Wattiyah airbase

POLITICAL FORECAST

Haftar's acceptance of the "popular mandate" prompted diplomatic responses that echoed similar views and described the move as "unilateral", urging both the GNA and LNA to revert to the Berlin Process negotiations. Observers have pointed to the fact that further escalation remains a likely scenario in the medium term as both LNA foreign backers and Turkey will continue to view Libya as a theatre to safeguard their broader geopolitical interests. Even if the 5+5 JMC talks and other UN-mediated negotiations were to resume after Ramadan, they are unlikely to be successful. Meanwhile, in Tripoli, the long-standing dispute resurfaced this week between GNA PM Fayez Al-Serraj and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) governor, Sadiq Al-Kebir. Tensions between the two are over the issuance of letters of credit (LCs) and against the backdrop of changes in the currency exchange rates at the parallel market. Regionally, Algeria's President Abdelmajid Tebboune confirmed his country's diplomatic efforts to solve the Libyan crisis have been undermined by countries opposing Algeria's influence in the region. Speaking to local media, Tebboune reiterated his country's support for the popular will of Libyans. In a separate development, GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha renewed his government's opposition to the EU's Operation Irini to enforce the arms embargo off Libya's coast. In a closed-door virtual conference call on 30 April, Bashagha told European officials Irini only restricts the "legitimate support" the GNA receives while ignoring LNA arms embargo violations. Of note, Irini is due to begin operating in the "coming days", according to Peter Stano, a spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. An agreement was reportedly reached between EU member states on 28 April to supply vessels, aircraft, and satellites to monitor the arms embargo in Libya. However, conflicting reports indicate the Mission could be delayed and/or is unlikely to have its intended operational capacity due to internal disagreements.

WHAT OTHER EXPERTS SAY

In a comprehensive report, *International Crisis Group (ICG)* explores Turkey's intervention to support GNA forces and its long-term ramifications. ICG argues that while Turkey's intervention has propped up GNA forces and helped slow the LNA's advance, it has done little to de-escalate the conflict and risks prolonging it instead as more foreign actors fund their local allies to repel Ankara. ICG advises "Ankara should engage with other external players involved in the conflict to explore potential compromises regarding their respective interests in Libya and beyond." The article points to the risk of mission creep for Ankara highlighting the fact "Turkey risks being dragged into a war well beyond what it originally signed up for", especially given its involvement in Syria against Assad regime forces and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). The ICG article explores the rationale behind Turkey's initial involvement in Libya and how Ankara built the case, both domestically and internationally, for an intervention to support the GNA. In relation to the maritime demarcation deal between Ankara and the GNA, the article highlights Turkey's intention in the East Med is to contain regional actors with opposing interests. "No country other than Libya accepts the legality of Turkey's delimitation scheme, and the likelihood of international oil companies agreeing to carry out exploration activities in "disputed waters" is low. Turkey is therefore unlikely to derive financial gain from its move in the foreseeable future. Yet the agreement can help Ankara thwart other states' projects that would in effect exclude Turkey from the eastern Mediterranean and reduce its influence. From Turkey's point of view, the new agreement achieves two objectives. In the short term, it can raise the cost of, and delay through lawsuits, the construction of the 1,900km (1,180 mile) eastern Mediterranean natural gas pipeline that Greece, Israel and Cyprus want to develop, rendering it unviable. In the long term, it lays the groundwork for forcing Egypt and Israel to backtrack on their EEZ agreements with Greece."

SECURITY FORECAST

In Tripoli, the unilateral truce during Ramadan is unlikely to suspend clashes between GNA and LNA forces. Overall, no major changes to positions are expected across Tripoli. In terms of tactics, LNA forces will continue to rely on heavy artillery shelling. GNA forces could attempt a renewed push across Tripoli International Airport (TIP). Losing TIP would prove detrimental to the LNA's posture south of the capital, forcing LNA forces to retreat southward. Indiscriminate mortar/rocket shells will continue to land across Tripoli's residential areas and expose civilians. For its part, the LNA will likely place its bets on the summer period to exploit grievances linked to power cuts and other shortages in GNA-held territory across the West, especially given the growing budget constraints. Meanwhile, west of Tripoli, GNA forces will continue to prioritise Al-Wattiyah airbase as a strategic target in the medium term. Additional airstrikes and possible coordinate attacks are expected against the airbase. The Garabolli front, east of Tripoli, will continue to see escalated levels of military activity with possible LNA tactical incursions into the coastal road. GNA UAV strikes will continue to target LNA supply lines from the east to Tripoli's southern frontlines in an effort to halt the supply of fuel and goods. Meanwhile, sources reported an uptick in criminal activity across Msallatah, Al-Zawiya, Gharyan and Sabratah. In Khoms and Zawiya, religious tensions are high between Madkhali Salafis and Islamists aligned to the pro-Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). After recently expanding their influence West of Tripoli, pro-LIFG elements closed religious affairs buildings in Khoms and Zawiya, accusing Madkhali Salafis of being aligned to Haftar's forces. Turning to the southern region, GNA and LNA alliances will continue to be tested in the medium term. Sporadic security incidents and politically-charged statements are likely in the area as the GNA and LNA compete for political influence across Fezzan.

LIBYANS AND THE ARAB STREET

UNSMIL documented at least 131 civilian casualties, including 64 deaths, from 01 Jan-31 March 2020. The figures were published on 30 April in the Mission's first civilian casualties report for 2020. The report contains a new section breaking down the civilian casualties by parties to the conflict. The Mission notes 81% of civilian casualties are attributed to the LNA during the reporting period. Of note, before the LNA's offensive on Tripoli, the Mission published a monthly civilian casualty report. The newly-published report reads: "During the first three months of 2020, ground fighting was the leading cause of civilian casualties, causing 73 per cent of the total. UNSMIL documented 78 civilian casualties (32 deaths and 46 injuries) from the use of heavy weapons (rockets/artillery/mortars), and 18 civilian casualties (12 deaths and six injuries) from the use of small arms fire. Targeted killings were the second leading recorded cause of civilian casualties with 20 victims (14 deaths and six injuries), representing 15 per cent of the total civilian casualties. Airstrikes were the third leading cause of civilian casualties with nine victims (six deaths and three injuries), followed by improvised explosive device (IEDs) with six injuries. Like the fourth quarter of 2019, civilians living in the western part of Libya were most affected. Since the outbreak of conflict on 4 April 2019, fighting between forces affiliated to the LNA and the GNA continued to gain control of areas in the western Libya. UNSMIL documented 117 civilian casualties (53 deaths and 64 injuries) in western Libya, amounting to 89 per cent of the total. The remaining 11 per cent of the total civilian casualties (11 deaths and three injuries) occurred in the central part of the country."

About Whispering Bell



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